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ABSTRACT 
The conventional wisdom states that prosecuting corporations can 
subject them to terrible collateral consequences that risk putting them out 
of business and causing massive social and economic harm.  According to 
this viewpoint, which has come to dominate the literature following the 
demise of Arthur Andersen after that firm’s prosecution in the wake of the 
Enron scandal, even a criminal indictment can be a “corporate death 
penalty.”  The Department of Justice (DOJ) has implicitly accepted this 
view by declining to prosecute many large companies in favor of using 
criminal settlements called deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs).  Yet, 
there is no evidence to support the existence of the “Andersen Effect” and 
the much-hyped corporate death penalty.  Indeed, no one has ever 
empirically studied what happens to companies after conviction.  In this 
Article, I do just that.  Using the database of organizational convictions 
made publicly available by Professor Brandon Garrett, I find that no 
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publicly traded company failed because of a conviction that occurred in the 
years 2001 to 2010.  Moreover, many convictions included plea agreements 
that imposed compliance programs such as those that some advocates view 
as a key justification for using DPAs.  Because corporate convictions do 
not have the terrible consequences they were assumed to have and because 
convictions can be used to obtain compliance programs just as effectively 
as DPAs can, the DOJ should prosecute more law-breaking companies and 
reserve DPAs for extraordinary circumstances.  In the absence of some 
other justification for using DPAs, the DOJ should exploit the stronger 
deterrent value of corporation prosecution to its full capacity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen the dawning of a 
new era of criminality.  This new era has been planned and perpetuated not 
by such traditional criminal players as organized crime or drug cartels, but 
instead by the large, multinational corporations that are essential actors in 
both the economy and society at large.  Since the Enron scandal burst open 
in late 2001, marking the beginning of a decade of fraud and wrongdoing 
that culminated in the recent financial crisis, the criminal acts of large 
corporations have rocked the nation and brought the world economy to its 
knees.  It is no exaggeration to say that corporate crime, and the struggle to 
counteract it, has become one of the most pressing legal issues of the new 
millennium. 
Under current law, there are a number of ways to combat corporate 
crime.  Corporations can be prosecuted to impose punitive fines and the 
stigma of conviction, corporate officers can be prosecuted to ensure that 
individuals who break the law on behalf of their corporations are punished, 
structural reforms and compliance programs may be implemented through 
the use of deferred and non-prosecution agreements, and the entire body of 
civil and regulatory law can be used to impose fines and win compensation 
for victims.
1
  Each of these methods has its proponents and detractors.  In 
this Article, I provide novel empirical evidence to demonstrate that the first 
of these methods, the criminal prosecution of the corporate entity itself, has 
been fundamentally misunderstood by scholars, commentators, and 
policymakers. 
While the fact that corporations cannot be imprisoned has long been 
recognized as an inherent incongruity of corporate criminal liability,
2
 most 
commentators believe that corporate prosecutions play an important role in 
deterring corporate crime.
3
  That said, there is a broad consensus—and a 
 
 1.  Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 875–86 
(2007) [hereinafter Garrett, Structural Reform] (reviewing alternative means of combating 
corporate crime). 
 2.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 
389–90 (1981) (discussing the deterrent value of corporate prosecutions for intangible 
entities). 
 3.  See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 271, 273–74 (2008) (noting that the consensus among scholars favors some measure 
of corporate criminal liability).  This belief is not universal, however.  A prominent voice 
against corporate criminal liability is that of Professor Richard Epstein, a leading member of 
the law and economics movement.  See Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution 
Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at A14 (arguing that the government should limit 
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deep fear—that the stigma and side effects of corporate prosecutions can be 
so damaging that they pose a severe risk of driving companies out of 
business.  Therefore, many believe that prosecutions should be limited to 
avoid this result.
4
  The belief that prosecutions are a “corporate death 
penalty” was amplified immeasurably by the collapse of Arthur Andersen 
LLP, Enron’s accountant, after Arthur Andersen was convicted of 
obstruction of justice for destroying tons of potentially incriminating 
documents in the days leading up to Enron’s implosion.
5
  For many 
commentators, it is now unquestioned dogma that a criminal indictment 
alone can easily destroy even a large, powerful corporation.
6
 
In large part because of the backlash caused by Andersen’s demise, 
the DOJ has shifted its approach to enforcing the criminal law against large 
corporations.
7
  While small companies are still routinely convicted, usually 
through plea agreement though sometimes by trial verdict, many large 
corporations are not actually prosecuted; instead they receive settlements 
known as deferred or non-prosecution agreements (collectively, DPAs).
8
  
These DPAs are, for all intents and purposes, criminal settlement 
agreements by which companies agree to cooperate with the government, 
admit some level of wrongdoing, pay fines and restitution, implement 
compliance programs, and undertake other reforms, all in exchange for the 
government’s agreeing to not prosecute the corporation.
9
  In theory, these 
arrangements are mutually beneficial:  DPAs supposedly allow the DOJ to 
efficiently enforce the law and obtain monetary restitution for victims 
while also permitting companies to avoid criminal conviction and the 
resulting “Arthur Andersen Effect,” that is, the expense, stigma, and other 
collateral consequences that accompany a criminal conviction. 
DPAs themselves are highly controversial in many respects.  Criticism 
of these agreements runs the gamut.  Some scholars, particularly members 
 
criminal law enforcement to suits against individuals). 
 4.  See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 3, at 274 (“Yet, the prevailing view is that 
prosecutors should balance the need to deter corporate crime against a conviction’s dire 
consequences for employees and other innocent stakeholders.”). 
 5.  See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917, 929–
34 (2004) (describing Andersen’s destruction of Enron documents). 
 6.  See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (listing scholars who argue that 
criminal indictments can destroy even the most established companies).  Andersen itself, of 
course, was a professional services partnership and not a corporation, but this important fact 
is often ignored by commentators. 
 7.  Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 1, at 880, 887–89. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 321–22 (2007). 
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of the law and economics movement, argue that DPAs can often constitute 
extreme abuses of prosecutorial discretion.
10
  Other scholars decry DPAs as 
a means of letting corporate criminals escape with a slap on the wrist.
11
  
And others advocate for specific reforms while accepting DPAs as a 
legitimate tool.
12
  Unfortunately, in spite of the great volume of 
commentary on the matter, there is little to no empirical proof that DPAs 
are effective at deterring or otherwise preventing corporate crime, and there 
is anecdotal evidence of DPAs failing spectacularly at preventing corporate 
recidivism.  While a few scholars have performed invaluable empirical 
studies of DPAs by laboriously gathering them and documenting their 
attributes,
13
 the question of whether DPAs “work” has not been answered.
14
 
I attempt to answer a different question, one that has been almost 
entirely ignored in the literature.  The question that should be asked, from 
the policymaker’s perspective, is not whether DPAs “work,” but whether 
DPAs work better than actual corporate prosecutions and convictions.  As 
is generally recognized in the literature, prosecutions have a stronger 
deterrent effect than do DPAs, which typically lack the stigma and 
potential collateral consequences that accompany convictions.  Therefore, 
because their deterrent value is weaker, the use of DPAs can only be 
justified if DPAs provide some other advantage that prosecutions lack.  
Recognizing this problem, DPA advocates generally cite two purported 
advantages to justify the use of DPAs.  The first, as already mentioned, is 
that corporate prosecutions cannot be used in many cases because they risk 
causing huge social costs, such as massive job losses, by dooming 
companies to the fate of Arthur Andersen.  The second is that DPAs can be 
used to force corporations to voluntarily agree to valuable structural 
reforms and compliance programs that are unavailable in the adversarial 
 
 10.  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 3 (arguing that the government is abusing the threat of 
prosecution in order to unfairly coerce corporations into DPAs). 
 11.  See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 
1795 (2011) [hereinafter Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions] (noting that some 
advocates condemn the trend away from corporate prosecutions). 
 12.  See, e.g., Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle Over 
Waiver of the Attorney–Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 54 (2008) (arguing that 
prosecutors should continue to have the power to demand that corporations waive the 
attorney–client privilege as a condition of receiving DPAs, but that additional protections 
should be added to protect individuals’ rights against self-incrimination). 
 13.  See, e.g., Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 1 (analyzing the characteristics of 
thirty-five DPAs entered into between 2003 and 2007). 
 14.  This is not to say that nobody has tried to do so.  See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David 
Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679 
(2009) (using targeted interviews to attempt to draw anecdotal evidence of the success or 
failure of corporate monitors put in place as part of DPAs). 
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setting of a prosecution. 
This Article presents novel evidence that DPAs possess neither of 
these proposed advantages.  The Article surveys every available federal 
conviction of a publicly traded company that occurred in the years between 
2001 and 2010, inclusive, and concludes that the risk of driving companies 
out of business through prosecutions has been radically exaggerated, and 
that prosecutions can indeed be used to obtain structural reforms.  When 
viewed in light of the empirical evidence, the DOJ’s policy of preferring 
DPAs is unsupportable.  The Article proceeds in the following manner.  
Part I discusses the background of corporate criminal liability and the 
government’s trend toward using DPAs.  Part II discusses the methodology 
used in analyzing the available data and explains how the survey was 
conducted and the results were obtained.  Part III lays out the results of the 
study and discusses some of the implications of these results.  Finally, Part 
IV makes a normative prescription:  In most cases, the use of DPAs should 
be phased out in favor of pursuing corporate criminal convictions.    
Because the risk of driving large companies out of business through 
prosecution is far less than the conventional wisdom assumes—and is 
perhaps even negligible—and because convictions can also be used to 
obtain structural reforms, then, in the absence of some other justification 
for the use of DPAs, the use of corporate convictions should be favored 
because of their naturally stronger deterrent value. 
 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
A. Corporate Criminal Liability Pre-Andersen 
In the United States, corporations have long been held liable for the 
criminal acts of their employees.  The traditional common law rule that 
corporations could not be held criminally liable for most acts had largely 
vanished by the early twentieth century.
15
  As early as 1909, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that corporations could be criminally liable for crimes 
of intent that were committed by their employees.
16
  Since then, the 
doctrine of respondeat superior has allowed corporations to be convicted 
for the criminal acts of their employees so long as those acts were made in 
 
 15.  See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1479–83 (1996) (discussing the historical development of corporate 
criminal liability from sixteenth-century English law to twentieth-century American law). 
 16.  N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909); 
Khanna, supra note 15, at 1482–83. 
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the scope of employment and with the intent of benefitting the 
corporation.
17
  The doctrine is broadly applicable, and corporations have 
been held liable for almost all types of crimes, with the exception of crimes 
like murder or rape, which in many jurisdictions require a particular type of 
malicious intent on the part of the wrongdoer.
18
 
Even so, until the 1990s, corporate prosecutions were a minor part of 
American law.  Before that time, prosecutions occurred but fines were very 
small, much smaller than the penalties imposed by the administrative 
actions and private lawsuits that inevitably arise as a result of corporate 
law-breaking.
19
  Things began to change with the passage of the Sentencing 
Reform Act in 1984, which established the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
and, ultimately, the federal Sentencing Guidelines.
20
  In light of evidence 
that organizations were, on average, receiving criminal fines that did not 
even rise to the level of the damage their crimes caused, the Commission 
determined to create guidelines that would follow a modified version of the 
“optimal deterrence” school of law and economics thought.
21
  In the end, 
the guidelines radically increased penalties for corporate criminal liability 
while also allowing reduced punishments and incentives for good faith 
cooperation by corporate defendants.
22
 
Armed with the power to seek larger, more punitive fines, the DOJ 
began to ramp up corporate prosecutions during the 1990s.
23
  This 
development was legally strengthened in 1999, when then-Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder drafted the first set of DOJ guidelines to provide 
instructions on how federal prosecutors were to prosecute corporations.
24
  
 
 17.  Hamdani & Klement, supra note 3, at 277, 295. 
 18. This limitation has been long noted.  See Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal 
Responsibility, 36 YALE L. J. 827, 828–29 (1927) (listing court decisions holding that 
corporations could not be held liable for crimes involving a conspicuous element of mens 
rea); Khanna, supra note 15, at 1484 (noting the longstanding acceptance of this limitation). 
 19.  See Coffee, supra note 2, at 388, 405–06 (noting that criminal fines for corporate 
crime were “insignificant” before 1980, and describing in detail the relatively tiny fines 
imposed for criminal antitrust violations). 
 20.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).  See 
Ilene M. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About 
Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 206–08 (1993) (describing the passage of the 
Sentencing Reform Act and the Commission’s work on drafting guidelines for 
organizational sentences). 
 21.  Nagel & Winthrop, supra note 20, at 214–22. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1870 (stating 
that the number of corporate convictions rose through the 1990s, but cautioning that some of 
the rise might be due to better data collection). 
 24.  Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecutorial Abuse 
MARKOFF - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2013  12:41 PM 
804 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:3 
 
This “Holder Memo,” as it became known, advised prosecutors to base 
charging decisions against corporations on the same factors used in 
prosecuting individuals, such as the sufficiency of the evidence, the 
likelihood of success at trial, and the deterrent value of prosecution.
25
  
However, the Holder Memo supplemented these factors with eight 
additional factors unique to organizational prosecutions:  (1) “the nature 
and seriousness of the offense”; (2) the “pervasiveness of wrongdoing 
within the corporation”; (3) the corporation’s history of past criminal 
conduct; (4) the corporation’s timely disclosure and willingness to 
cooperate; (5) the adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program; (6) 
the remedial actions the corporation had undertaken; (7) the collateral 
consequences of prosecution to innocent shareholders and employees; and 
(8) the “adequacy of non-criminal remedies.”
26
 
In 2000, the year after the Holder Memo was issued, the number of 
corporate convictions reached an all-time high of approximately 300.
27
  The 
Holder Memo has since been superseded by other DOJ guidance 
documents, but the factors it outlined remain the basic framework on which 
charging decisions are made.  However, the politics of corporate criminal 
prosecution were to change dramatically only three years after the memo 
was published, even though the law itself did not change.  The catalyst for 
this shift was the dramatic downfall of Arthur Andersen. 
 
B. The Collapse of Arthur Andersen and the Move Toward DPAs 
Arthur Andersen LLP, formerly one of the “big five” accounting 
firms, was the outside accountant of Enron Corporation.
28
  In that role, 
Andersen was at least negligent of—and many commentators believe 
complicit with—the fraudulent accounting schemes that contributed to 
Enron’s downfall.
29
  And, as Enron entered its death throes in the weeks 
leading up to its bankruptcy filing in late 2001, high-ranking Andersen 
partner David Duncan, the leader of Andersen’s Enron account, ordered 
 
in the Corporate Criminal Charging Decision, 9 WYO. L. REV. 229, 239 (2009). 
 25.  Memorandum from the Deputy Att’y Gen. to the Component Heads & U.S. 
Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corps. (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder 
Memo], available at http://federalevidence.com/corporate-prosecution-principles. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1870. 
 28.  Brickey, supra note 5, at 917. 
 29.  See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 143–49 (2003) (describing Andersen’s 
failure to challenge Enron’s questionable and ultimately fraudulent accounting practices). 
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Andersen employees to destroy enormous quantities of Enron documents.
30
  
While the shredding eventually stopped in early November 2001, after the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) subpoenaed Andersen, the 
firm had by that time already destroyed literally tons of documents that 
could have provided evidence of Enron’s wrongdoing and of Andersen’s 
own complicity.
31
 
Andersen publicly admitted the document destruction in January 
2002.
32
  At that point, its major clients began fleeing in droves, and 
Andersen began negotiating with the government to avoid criminal 
prosecution.
33
  Avoiding prosecution without admitting guilt was crucial to 
the firm’s chances of survival because Andersen had previously admitted to 
its involvement in numerous other fraudulent schemes.  Indeed, it had 
settled criminal charges in 1996 by agreeing to a DPA, and, just months 
before the Enron debacle, the SEC had censured Andersen as part of a 
settlement permanently enjoining the firm from violating the federal 
securities laws.
34
  If Andersen admitted its fault, it would have further 
damaged its reputation, and a conviction would likely have resulted—as it 
ultimately did—in the SEC’s disbarring Andersen from auditing public 
companies.  Therefore, Andersen was desperate to avoid admitting to 
wrongdoing.
35
  To that end, it offered to enter into a DPA, to follow a new 
compliance program, and to have an independent monitor appointed to 
ensure that it followed the law.
36
  However, it refused to admit wrongdoing 
even as part of a DPA that would allow it to avoid conviction, and the DOJ 
quite reasonably would not agree to such an extravagant demand.
37
  
Andersen was indicted in March 2002, and its business crumbled in the 
time leading up to its conviction that June.
38
 
The backlash against the government’s actions was immediate.  
Andersen’s defense strategy had revolved heavily on a public relations 
 
 30.  Brickey, supra note 5, at 929–34. 
 31.  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 29, at 383. 
 32.  Brickey, supra note 5, at 920. 
 33.  Id. at 924–25, 951. 
 34.  Id. at 922–27. 
 35.  Id. at 921, 924–26. 
 36.  Id. at 921, 924–26. 
 37.  Id. at 924–26. 
 38.  Andersen’s conviction was ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court because of 
error in the jury instructions.  Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 
(2005).  Though the reversal did not damage the government’s factual case, and a retrial 
would likely have been successful, the DOJ decided not to retry the case on remand, as the 
business was already long defunct.  John C. Roper et al., Government won’t retry Anderson 
criminal case, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 23, 2005, at B1.  
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campaign that tried the case in the popular press; even while the trial was 
ongoing, the firm loudly decried the prosecution’s actions as a witch hunt.
39
  
While the attack on the DOJ did not help Andersen, the idea that corporate 
prosecutions are unjustifiably dangerous has lived on and dominates 
academic discussions of corporate wrongdoing.  Andersen’s collapse, many 
commentators argue, showed that a mere indictment can destroy even a 
huge, established company by causing extreme reputational damage and by 
triggering other collateral consequences, such as disbarment, exclusion 
from government contracts, or the activation of loan covenants that raise 
the cost of borrowing.
40
  Some commentators even veer into the hyperbolic 
and go so far as to make such claims as the following:  “Indictment alone, 
prior to any litigation, usually results in the death of any business entity by 
means of reputational damage in the marketplace and damage to the 
financial interests of its shareholders and investors.”
41
 
Following this torrid criticism, the DOJ changed its tactics.  While 
small companies are usually still convicted (either by guilty verdict after a 
trial or by plea agreement), the DOJ has embraced the use of DPAs as an 
 
 39.  See Brickey, supra note 5, at 942–45 (describing Andersen’s public relations 
campaign, which involved employee protests, newspaper advertisements, grassroots 
lobbying of Congress and the DOJ by employees, and a website that hosted papers claiming 
that the prosecution was legally flawed and an abuse of the government’s power). 
 40.  See, e.g., Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 426 (2007) (“A criminal indictment can have devastating 
consequences for a corporation and risks the market imposing what is in effect a corporate 
death penalty.”); Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Corporate Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1436 (2007) (“When 
Andersen collapsed after its indictment, federal prosecutors realized that prosecution alone 
could destroy even the most established of companies.”); Joseph A. Grundfest, Op-Ed., 
Over Before it Started, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A23 (“But Andersen’s demise did 
serve as a stern reminder to corporate America that prosecutors can bring down or cripple 
many of America’s leading corporations simply by indicting them on sufficiently serious 
charges.  No trial is necessary.”); see also, e.g., James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment 
and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 509, 511 (2006) (“In short, the 
United States Government has the power to destroy a partnership, such as an accounting or 
law firm, without the burden of trial or having to provide evidence of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”).  Notably, the fact that Andersen was a partnership, a form of the 
corporate entity that is often more fragile than that of a corporation or limited liability 
company, is only rarely mentioned. 
 41.  Matt Senko, Note, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 164 (2009) (emphasis added); see also Edward 
B. Diskant, Note, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely 
American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 128–29 
(2008) (“[I]t is common wisdom within the business community that a conviction amounts 
to a potentially lethal blow for a corporation, one from which the corporation may not 
recover even if it is actually innocent . . . .”). 
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alternative means of enforcing the criminal law against many large 
companies, particularly publicly traded corporations.
42
  As already 
mentioned, by using DPAs, the DOJ avoids the potential collateral 
consequences of indictment and conviction while obtaining structural 
reforms and the corporation’s aid in prosecuting individual corporate 
officers.  In exchange, the DOJ gives up the increased deterrent effect of 
actually prosecuting the corporation itself.  Pursuant to this new strategy, 
corporate convictions have declined from a high of 300 in the year 2000 to 
an average of less than 200 (mostly small) convicted organizations per year 
for the years 2001–2010, with only 145 organizations convicted in 2010.
43
  
By contrast, the number of DPAs has climbed steadily, from a handful per 
year before Andersen to an average of approximately 30 per year, the vast 
bulk of which are entered into by large, multinational corporations.
44
 
 
C. Where We Stand Today: The Controversies of the Modern DPA 
Era 
DPAs are enjoying their time in the sun, their use bolstered by a 
continued belief in the devastating power of the Andersen Effect.
45
  Indeed, 
at the same time this Article was being submitted for publication, former 
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, until recently the head of the 
DOJ’s Criminal Division, extolled the virtues of DPAs in a now-famous 
speech to the New York City Bar Association.
46
  Breuer noted that “DPAs 
have become a mainstay of white collar criminal law enforcement” and 
praised them as having “a truly transformative effect on particular 
companies and, more generally, on corporate culture across the globe.”
47
  In 
 
 42.  Griffin, supra note 9, at 321–22; see Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 
supra note 11, at 1804 (noting that most corporations that are convicted are relatively 
small).  Indeed, as I found while conducting this study, large, public corporations receive 
DPAs almost twice as often as they are convicted.  In the years 2001–2010, eighty-nine 
publicly traded companies received DPAs while there were only fifty-four convictions of 
publicly traded companies.  Data on file with Author. 
 43.  Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1804, 1870; infra 
notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 44.  Id. at 1794, 1871. 
 45.  See generally Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Behind the Gentler Approach 
to Banks by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A1 (discussing the rise of DPAs and 
summarizing common criticisms of their use). 
 46.  Lanny A. Breuer, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the New York City Bar 
Association (Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2 
012/crm-speech-1209131.html. 
 47.  Id. 
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particular, Breuer spoke at length of the dangers of potential collateral 
consequences of conviction (i.e., the Andersen Effect) and, controversially, 
lauded DPAs for giving the government leverage to obtain settlements in 
situations where prosecutors previously had “faced a stark choice when 
they encountered a corporation that had engaged in misconduct—either 
indict, or walk away.”
48
 
But while DPAs are in vogue at the DOJ, they have been fiercely 
criticized elsewhere.  In fact, the settlement leverage that Breuer praised is 
extraordinarily controversial among academics and the corporate defense 
bar.  Professor Mike Koehler, a leading expert on the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, responded to Breuer’s negative view of the “stark choice” 
between indictment and declining to prosecute by stating: 
There is absolutely, positively nothing wrong with this choice.  
Bringing criminal charges against [a] person (natural or legal) 
should not be easy.  It should be difficult.  Our founding fathers 
recognized this as a necessary bulwark against an all powerful 
government.  There is no legal or policy reason warranting a 
change from such a fundamental and long-lasting principle.
49
 
Similarly, many other commentators accuse the DOJ of abusing its 
prosecutorial discretion by conditioning DPAs on demands for expensive 
compliance programs and, in particular, by requesting that corporations 
waive their attorney–client privilege as part of the agreements so that the 
DOJ may use privileged corporate documents to prosecute individual 
corporate officers.
50
  Typically, these commentators argue that 
corporations, fearful of the grave danger of being driven out of business 
and suffering the same fate as Arthur Andersen, have no choice but to 
buckle and agree to whatever demands the DOJ makes, no matter how 
ruthless, unfair, or coercive.
51
  This argument is exemplified by a column 
 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Mike Koehler, Assistant Attorney General Breuer’s Unconvincing Defense of 
DPAs/NPAs, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/assistant-
attorney-general-breuers-unconvincing-defense-of-dpas-npas. 
 50.  See Seigel, supra note 12, at 4–5 (detailing the corporate backlash against DPAs). 
 51.  See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 9, at 327 (“Because virtually no company will risk 
indictment, prosecutors have come to expect compliance with every government demand.”); 
Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1457 (“The legal and reputational vulnerabilities detailed above 
make corporations uniquely weak negotiators in the criminal context.  Since corporations 
cannot run the risk of going to trial, their choice to accept a deferred prosecution agreement 
is not really a choice at all.”); see also Weissmann & Newman, supra note 40, at 426 
(stating after the Andersen case that “[c]orporate America could see both the resolve of the 
government to prosecute even the largest of corporations, as well as the consequences that 
could ensue from a company’s refusal to settle”). 
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written in 2005 by former SEC Commissioner and famed Stanford Law 
School professor Joseph Grundfest, who, in a claim rather ironically made 
just several years prior to the infamous bailout of American International 
Group, Inc., stated that “[i]f the government insists that A.I.G.’s chief 
executive be fired as part of the price of not indicting the firm, the chief 
executive is gone.”
52
 
More recently, however, the DOJ has come under withering fire from 
the opposite flank, from critics who argue that DPAs are nothing more than 
ineffective sweetheart deals that do nothing to deter companies from 
breaking the law by allowing criminal companies to get off with a slap on 
the wrist.  These critics typically argue that corporations should instead be 
subject to indictment and conviction in order to maintain a strong deterrent 
effect.
53
  This perspective, one that tracks many of the populist feelings 
prevalent in the American consciousness today, is well-represented by the 
writings of Randall Eliason, a former fraud prosecutor from the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia.  As Mr. Eliason wrote of 
the increased use of DPAs: 
With the threat of criminal liability effectively off the table, 
corporate executives may be more willing to skate aggressively 
close to the line—or to jump over it.  If the prospect of real 
criminal sanctions against the company is removed, then 
engaging in criminal activity becomes just another dollars-and-
cents decision.  The moral condemnation aspect of a criminal 
conviction is lost—and with it the unique deterrent value of 
criminal law.
54
 
This brand of criticism recently reached a new height in the aftermath of 
the DOJ’s December 2012 announcement that it had entered into a $1.9 
billion DPA with HSBC, the world’s third-largest publicly held bank.  
HSBC stood accused of deliberately laundering billions of dollars in cash 
for violent international drug cartels such as the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel 
and the Colombian Norte del Valle Cartel, and of “violating U.S. sanctions 
for years by illegally conducting transactions on behalf of customers in 
Iran, Libya, Cuba, Sudan and Burma.”
55
  Yet, despite these horrendous 
 
 52.  Grundfest, supra note 40. 
 53.  Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1795. 
 54.  Randall D. Eliason, We Need to Indict Them, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008; see also 
Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1481, 1482–86 (2009) (arguing that corporations, as large, powerful actors, are more 
than just legal fictions and should bear direct responsibility for their acts). 
 55.  James O’Toole & Charles Riley, HSBC Pays $1.9 Billion to Settle U.S. Probe, 
CNNMONEY (Dec. 11, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/10/news/companies/hsbc-
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allegations, the DOJ was content with entering into a DPA with HSBC, 
with former Assistant Attorney General Breuer declaring that “HSBC is 
being held accountable for stunning failures of oversight.”
56
 
The response was immediate and scathing.  A New York Times 
editorial declared that it was “a dark day for the rule of law” and that “the 
government has bought into the notion that too big to fail is too big to 
jail.”
57
  Similarly, Professor William Black, a lead financial regulator 
during the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, noted that HSBC was “a 
recidivist of epic proportions” and blasted the DOJ and other regulators for 
“sham[ing] their institutions and professions, and betray[ing] their duty to 
the nation and citizenry.”
58
  Other commentators were more restrained yet 
still critical, noting that the DPA “raise[d] questions about whether such 
deals constitute real punishment for large corporations and serve to deter 
similar white-collar crime” and that the veracity of Breuer’s claims that 
DPAs brought greater accountability for corporate wrongdoing was “far 
from clear.”
59
 
And thus the controversy has raged.  Yet, it has not been accompanied 
by any empirical attempt to determine whether the normal justifications 
given for using DPAs are legitimate.  The primary reason given for the use 
of DPAs, of course, is the Andersen Effect.  But no one has demonstrated 
that convictions actually cause a significant number of business failures 
among large corporations.
60
  In fact, some commentators have 
acknowledged in passing that most convictions do not drive corporations 
out of business.
61
  In other words, the national policy of preferring DPAs 
 
money-laundering/. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A38. 
 58.  William K. Black, Why Did Obama and Cameron Save a Criminal Enterprise Like 
HSBC?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-
black/hsbc-settlement_b_2291859.html. 
 59.  Alain Sherter, HSBC Bankers Dodge Personal Accountability, CBS MONEYWATCH 
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-57558734/hsbc-bankers-
dodge-personal-accountability/ (heavily citing an earlier version of this Article).  Breuer 
announced his resignation a month later, in January 2013, shortly after appearing in the 
widely discussed Frontline documentary The Untouchables, in which he was critically 
questioned about his approach to prosecuting “Wall Street” fraud in the aftermath of the 
financial meltdown.  Sarah Childress, Report: DOJ Criminal Chief Lanny Breuer Stepping 
Down, FRONTLINE (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-
economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/report-doj-criminal-chief-lanny-breuer-stepping-
down/. 
 60. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 61.  See, e.g., Seigel, supra note 12, at 18 (“The collapse of [Andersen] as a result of 
being indicted was the exception, not the rule.”); Ball & Bolia, supra note 24, at 251 
(acknowledging that “[n]o major corporation has been driven out of business by a 
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over convictions is based on the fear of the Andersen Effect, but that fear is 
supported by nothing more than inconsistent anecdotal evidence.  No one 
has ever checked to see if the Andersen Effect actually exists. 
The second reason typically given for using DPAs is that DPAs can be 
used to make companies implement compliance programs, cooperate with 
individual prosecutions, and make other structural reforms.  These benefits 
are normally not available when corporations are convicted at trial since 
they are not normal criminal penalties and typically may only be put in 
place by consent.  However, part and parcel with this lack of empirical 
evidence for the Andersen Effect is the inconvenient fact that the often-
presented dichotomy of “indictment vs. DPA” does not accurately reflect 
the nuanced landscape of the corporate prosecution battlefield.  The DOJ is 
not dragging large corporations through epic, life-or-death trials; 
indictments are actually quite rare, and more than ninety percent of 
corporate convictions take place by plea agreement, just as they do in every 
other kind of federal criminal prosecution.
62
  In fiscal year 2010, for 
instance, 139 of the 145 organizations convicted in federal court were 
convicted by plea agreement.
63
 
In effect, the literature has been looking in the wrong place.  
Indictments receive great attention, but only insofar as the demise of Arthur 
Andersen is recited so often as to become a catechism.  DPAs have been 
extensively studied and debated in the literature.
64
  Yet, no one has checked 
to see whether corporations that are convicted actually suffer business 
failures, and, with the notable exception of Professor Garrett’s important 
new work on the prosecution of foreign companies,
65
 no scholars have 
studied corporate guilty plea agreements to see whether they can be used to 
obtain the structural reform benefits of DPAs.
66
  This Article is meant to fill 
 
government indictment since the Arthur Andersen case” (citing Joseph A. Grundfest, Over 
Before it Started, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A23)). 
 62.  See Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1801, 1801 
n.102 (stating this fact and noting that by Sentencing Commission statistics, only nine 
percent of convicted firms were convicted by trial verdict in the years 2000–2008). 
 63.  U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl.53 (2010). 
 64.  Compare Seigel, supra note 12, at 54 (arguing that prosecutors should be able to 
demand that corporations waive the attorney–client privilege as a condition of DPAs, but 
that additional protections should be added to protect individuals’ right against self-
incrimination), with Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1457–62 (criticizing the “Specter of Abuse” 
raised by the use of DPAs). 
 65.  See generally Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11. 
 66.  Cf. id. at 1801 (“We know little about corporate convictions and guilty pleas 
generally . . . .  [D]eferred and non-prosecution agreements have received scrutiny by 
Congress, the GAO, the DOJ, judges, the Bar, scholars, and corporations.  Corporate 
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both of these voids. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. Dataset Construction 
To study the validity of the Andersen Effect and the structural benefits 
of corporate guilty pleas, it was necessary to obtain a comprehensive list of 
convicted companies.  I began my research by creating a list of all publicly 
traded companies convicted of a federal criminal offense in the years 2001 
to 2010.  This was accomplished by utilizing the extensive, privately 
gathered collection of corporate plea agreements and docket sheets 
assembled and generously made publicly available by Professor Brandon 
Garrett of the University of Virginia School of Law.
67
  Although the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission reports that a total of 1,897 organizations were 
sentenced in the years 2001–2010,
68
 the Commission’s statistics are 
incomplete, especially with regard to large corporations, and do not provide 
the kind of detailed data I needed in order to perform the study.
69
  At the 
time of the study, by contrast, Professor Garrett’s database held the federal 
district court docket sheets for more than 1,700 federal criminal cases in 
which corporations were convicted, along with hundreds of plea 
agreements from those cases.
70
  Most importantly, the database was, and is, 
nearly comprehensive with respect to the cases involving large, publicly 
traded corporations convicted since 2000.
71
 
Starting with the 1,408 docket sheets provided by Professor Garrett’s 
collection for the years 2001–2010 (representing more than seventy-four 
percent of the total organizational convictions for those years),
72
 I screened 
 
convictions have not received such attention.”). 
 67.  Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1807–08; Brandon 
L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Plea Agreements, U. VA. SCH. OF LAW 
(last updated Oct. 10, 2011), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea_agreements/home.php? 
c=3&d=0. 
 68.  This number may be arrived at by tabulating the annual statistics publicly released 
in the USSC’s sourcebooks.  Annual Reports & Sourcebooks Archives, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Archives.cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 
2013). 
 69.  Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1804–06. 
 70.  By the time this Article was submitted for editing, the database had been expanded 
to include the docket sheets for more than 1,900 criminal cases.  Garrett & Ashley, supra 
note 67. 
 71.  Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1807–08. 
 72.  See supra text accompanying note 63. 
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out all convictions of corporations that were not publicly traded when 
charged or convicted, defining a company as “publicly traded” if it had 
made a filing with the SEC and, at the time of charging or conviction, was 
traded on a major domestic or foreign stock exchange.  Because my focus 
was on large companies, I excluded companies that were only listed on 
smaller exchanges like the NYSE MKT LLC (formerly called the 
American Stock Exchange, or AMEX) or traded on unlisted markets like 
the OTC Bulletin Board or Pink Sheets.  The time of charging was defined 
as the moment that a criminal information or indictment was filed against 
the company in question, and the time of conviction as the moment a plea 
agreement was filed or a guilty verdict rendered.
73
 
I performed the initial screening of SEC filings by conducting 
company name searches for each corporate defendant in the EDGAR 
database, the SEC’s centralized tool for searching documents filed with the 
SEC.
74
  Because all public companies on major domestic exchanges and 
many companies on foreign exchanges have to make periodic SEC filings, 
the EDGAR searches allowed me to find every company—with the 
possible exception of some foreign companies that had never made any 
filings with the SEC—that had ever been listed on a major stock exchange, 
even if it later merged, changed its name, or went out of business.  Of 
course, because many companies are required to make SEC filings even if 
they are not “public” as the term is colloquially used, the EDGAR searches 
were highly overinclusive and turned up a large number of false positives. 
For quality control, after each EDGAR search, I conducted additional, 
secondary searches to determine whether the company in question was 
traded on a major domestic or foreign stock exchange at the time of its 
conviction.  Generally, I performed secondary searches with tools like the 
Bloomberg BusinessWeek website
75
 and Google searches targeted for the 
appropriate time period.  These secondary searches helped to exclude the 
large number of false positives that initially appeared to be publicly traded 
(such as private subsidiaries with names very similar to a publicly traded 
 
 73.  Although I distinguished between the time of charging and the time of conviction, 
it should be noted that the distinction is irrelevant in the vast majority of cases.  Generally, 
the government and the defendant arrange a plea agreement ahead of time and submit it 
shortly after the charging information is filed.  Ultimately, the distinction between time of 
charging and time of conviction was not relevant to my study, as no company failed in the 
intervening period. 
 74.  Company Search, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searched 
gar/companysearch.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
 75.  Public Company Search, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businesswe 
ek.com/research/common/symbollookup/symbollookup.asp?region=ALL&letterIn=&search
Type=coname&x=0&y=0&lookuptype=public (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
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parent company) and to catch the very small number of public companies, 
generally foreign ones that did not file Forms 10K or 10Q, that were 
overlooked in the initial EDGAR search.  After I screened out all 
companies that did not meet my criteria, there remained a list of all 
publicly traded companies convicted during the ten-year period of 2001 to 
2010.
76
  These data are represented in Figure 1 below. 
 
B. Conviction Data and Fate After Conviction 
After obtaining a list of publicly traded companies convicted in the 
years 2001–2010, inclusive, I recorded their stock tickers and the 
exchanges they were listed on at the time of conviction.  Each company 
was then coded by whether its primary listing was on a domestic or a 
foreign exchange, and also coded as one of the following eight market 
sectors:  Energy,
77
 Manufacturing,
78
 Food,
79
 Chemicals/Materials,
80
 
Pharmaceuticals,
81
 Transportation,
82
 Defense,
83
 and Services.
84
  These 
 
 76.  As discussed in the results, I obtained a lower final number of publicly traded 
corporations than did either the U.S. Sentencing Commission or Professor Garrett.  The 
USSC reported sixty-three “openly traded” corporations for the years 2000–2009, nine more 
than my finding of fifty-four for the years 2001–2010.  Garrett, Globalized Corporate 
Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1807.  I believe this discrepancy is because I excluded a 
number of small public companies traded on minor stock exchanges like the old AMEX, 
companies that likely would be included in the USSC’s dataset.  In contrast, Professor 
Garrett reported that 125 publicly traded corporations were convicted in the years 2000–
2009.  The disparity between Professor Garrett’s findings and mine is due to our different 
definitions of what constitutes a publicly traded corporation.  Professor Garrett coded as 
public all companies that made an SEC filing reported on the EDGAR database, while I 
only deemed companies to be public if they made an SEC filing and were listed on a major 
stock exchange at the time they were charged or convicted.  Id. at 1807 n.129. 
 77.  Companies in the Energy sector included utilities and all companies primarily 
involved in natural resources exploitation, predominantly the exploitation of oil and natural 
gas. 
 78.  Companies in the Manufacturing sector included a variety of businesses primarily 
involved in making products other than specialized chemicals, pharmaceuticals, or national 
security products. 
 79.  Companies in the Food sector included all those companies primarily involved in 
the production, distribution, or retail of foodstuffs. 
 80.  Companies in the Chemicals/Materials sector included those involved in the 
refining of chemicals for purposes other than providing energy, as well as those companies 
that produced raw materials such as steel or aluminum. 
 81.  Companies in the Pharmaceuticals sector included those involved in the 
production, marketing, and wholesale distribution of pharmaceutical drugs, medical devices, 
and other products used for medicinal purposes. 
 82.  Companies in the Transportation sector included those involved in the trucking, 
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results are presented in Figure 2.  Next, the type of criminal charge the 
company pleaded to was coded as one of the following eight broad 
categories:  Environmental/Food,
85
 Antitrust, False Statements/ 
Obstruction,
86
 Fraud,
87
 Pharma/Drug, FCPA, Export, and Terrorist 
Transactions.  For companies that pleaded guilty to multiple violations 
from different categories, the violation was coded as the category that best 
reflected the conduct being charged; for example, for BAE Systems’s plea 
to FCPA violations and to making false statements, the charges were coded 
as FCPA, which was the predominant offense with which the company was 
charged.
88
  These data are presented in Figure 3. 
For each conviction, the following information was recorded:  the total 
monetary penalty imposed (not counting special assessments), whether a 
corporate monitor or a compliance plan was put in place as part of the plea 
agreement, whether the corporation agreed to further cooperate with the 
government, and whether any other penalties, such as community service 
or a waiver of the attorney–client privilege, were imposed.  Some of these 
data are presented in Figure 5, and the rest are presented in the Appendix. 
Most importantly, for each conviction, I determined whether the 
corporate convict had suffered a business failure as a result of the 
conviction.  First, I determined whether each convicted corporation was 
still listed under the same ticker on the same stock exchange that it had 
been listed on at the time of its conviction.  If it was, it was counted as 
“Currently Active.”  For those corporations that were no longer listed, I 
determined what had happened to them and why.  By using targeted 
Internet searches and by reviewing SEC filings when necessary, I searched 
for news and business articles that documented the time and nature of these 
companies’ ultimate fates.  For each company, I determined the class of 
event (e.g., a merger or bankruptcy) that had caused it to delist from its 
exchange.  Next, I determined whether the event was a voluntary part of the 
 
shipping, and air cargo industries. 
 83.  Companies in the Defense sector included those primarily involved in 
manufacturing national-security related products or providing security and logistical 
services to the U.S. government overseas. 
 84.  Companies in the Services sector included those primarily involved in providing 
professional or entertainment services. 
 85.  This broad category included pollution violations of the Clean Air Act and Clean 
Water Act, violations of acts protecting certain plants and wildlife, violations of acts 
banning adulterated foods, and other, related violations. 
 86.  This category included not only false statements and obstruction of justice, but also 
witness tampering and intimidation. 
 87.  This category included all kinds of fraud, including securities fraud. 
 88.  See infra app. A. 
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corporation’s business and viewed as a positive, or whether the corporation 
had been forced into the event by exigent circumstances.  For those events 
that were positives for the company, such as a merger in which the acquirer 
bought out the old shares at a premium, the event was coded as a “Merger.”  
For those where it appeared that the company’s acts were involuntary (such 
as a hostile takeover), were voluntary but taken as a desperate move to save 
the company’s business, or where the company simply went defunct, the 
event was coded as a “Business Failure.”  I then determined whether or not 
the conviction could reasonably be said to have been an important factor in 
the company’s failure. 
Finally, for each company not coded as “Currently Active,” I 
determined the length of time that had passed between the conviction and 
the event that caused it to delist from its exchange, and noted all instances 
where a Merger or Business Failure occurred within three years of the 
conviction.  These results, the heart of this Article, are presented in Figure 
4. 
 
C. Rationales 
Performing an empirical study of corporate convictions is an 
undertaking fraught with practical obstacles.  Given the lack of official 
tracking, there is no easily accessible, authoritative source of information 
on corporate prosecutions or convictions.  Official sources provide limited 
data—the USSC’s sourcebooks, for example, provide little more than the 
overall numbers of companies convicted each year.
89
  Privately collected 
databases, by contrast, may be more detailed but are unlikely to be 
comprehensive.  Moreover, they are at the mercy of such uncontrollable 
factors as whether the prosecutor who drafted the plea agreement clearly 
outlined the plea’s terms or whether the district court clerk correctly 
entered the corporate defendant’s name on the docket sheet.  Furthermore, 
the constantly shifting nature of the corporate entity is itself a barrier to 
study.  The nearly infinite variations of ownership structure, webs of 
subsidiaries, waves of mergers, and nearly constant name changes that 
ripple through the corporate ecosystem—much of which can be 
surprisingly difficult to discern and decipher, even in the Internet era—all 
combine to make tracking corporations over time an exasperating 
 
 89.  E.g., 2010 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/SBTOC
10.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
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endeavor, to say the least. 
With these practical limitations in mind, I limited the scope of the 
study to a particular subset of companies:  those that were (i) publicly 
traded and (ii) traded on a major stock exchange.  I did this for several 
reasons.  First, as a matter of practicality, it was essential to limit the study 
to companies about which a great deal of information is publicly available.  
This is the case with publicly traded corporations, which are widely 
followed in the popular press and are required to make numerous 
disclosures to investors.  In contrast, the actions of private companies can 
be much more difficult to determine from publicly available information; 
determining whether a private company that went out of business in 2004 
did so as a result of a conviction in 2002 could be a difficult, if not 
impossible, task. 
Second, publicly traded companies disproportionately tend to be some 
of the largest and most important companies in existence.  Determining the 
risk of putting them out of business is particularly important to making 
effective policy.
90
  Third, publicly traded companies can more easily be 
compared to one another, as they are similar in many respects.  Public 
domestic corporations, of course, are overwhelmingly incorporated in the 
State of Delaware and are governed under Delaware corporate law.  Most 
importantly, their ownership, though it can be diffuse or concentrated in a 
controlling shareholder that is its de facto owner, is not as variable as is the 
ownership of private corporations, which can have a variety of forms, from 
stand-alone companies owned by one or two individuals, to joint ventures 
between other companies, to wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Fourth, publicly traded companies may very likely be more easily 
affected by a conviction than are private companies.  Publicly traded 
corporations are players in the equity markets, and their stock price is 
extremely important to their health and survival.  Their credit ratings and 
loan covenants are often tied to stock price; a conviction that causes 
investors to flee a publicly held corporation’s stock could theoretically 
have devastating consequences to the corporation’s ability to obtain credit 
and could indirectly cause a liquidity crisis.  Private companies, by 
contrast, are not subject to this type of pressure and, in the case of wholly 
owned subsidiaries that can lean on their parent companies for funding, 
could theoretically be completely immune to such effects. 
The study was limited to companies traded on a major stock exchange, 
 
 90.  Cf. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1805–06 (noting 
that convictions of “larger, public firms” with larger fines are “the more significant cases of 
the most interest to researchers”). 
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excluding those traded on minor exchanges or on unlisted markets like the 
OTC Bulletin Board, for similar reasons.  The requirement of being traded 
on a major exchange served as a rough proxy for company size and ensured 
that every corporation in the study was at least large enough to maintain a 
position on a major exchange.  This avoided the potential sampling 
problem of making an apples-to-oranges comparison between industry 
giants and tiny companies with poorly regulated “over-the-counter” 
securities. 
Moreover, though small companies comprise the vast bulk of 
convicted organizations,
91
 each individual small company has less of an 
impact on the economy and society than does each individual large 
company.  Any business failure will have negative, often terrible effects on 
the owners and employees of that business, but the failure of a small 
company would not shake the entire nation as would the failure of, say, an 
ExxonMobil.
92
  Furthermore, small companies often may be mere shells 
that use the corporate form to disguise a purely criminal enterprise.
93
  The 
failure of such a shell operation should be seen as a social benefit or, at the 
very least, it should not be seen as a negative.  By contrast, the failure of a 
large company can have enormous effects, and those that are convicted, 
even those that have committed horrendous crimes, are almost always 
legitimate businesses.  Limiting the scope to companies traded on major 
exchanges allowed this study to focus on the companies that 
proportionately have the most impact on society and thus are of the most 
interest to policymakers. 
 
III. RESULTS 
A. Types of Companies and Charges 
Using the methodology described in the preceding Part, I obtained a 
list of fifty-four (54) separate federal convictions of publicly traded 
companies from the years 2001–2010.
94
  All were convicted by guilty plea, 
and indictments were only filed in two cases.  The majority of the 
 
 91.  Id. at 1804–05. 
 92.  I use ExxonMobil Corp. as an example only because that company was indeed 
convicted in the year 2009.  See infra app A. 
 93.  Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1804–05. 
 94.  Two companies, ICN Pharmaceuticals and Eli Lilly, were each convicted on two 
separate occasions.  I count each instance separately to arrive at the total of fifty-four 
convictions. 
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companies (34) were domestic, with a primary stock listing on either the 
NYSE or NASDAQ.  The remaining twenty companies were primarily 
listed on major foreign stock exchanges, most of which were located in 
Asia or Western Europe.
95
  These data are presented in Figure 1 on the next 
page and in the Appendices.  A wide variety of market sectors and 
industries were represented by the companies convicted.  The most 
common sector was Manufacturing (13), followed by Food (8), 
Pharmaceuticals (7), Transportation (7), and Chemicals/Materials(7).  Less 
common were the Energy (5), Defense (4), and Services (3) sectors.  
Conspicuously absent from the list were any banks or companies in the 
financial services sector.  These data are represented in Figure 2, on the 
next page. 
  
 
 95.  The total list of stock exchanges represented in this study were the NYSE, 
NASDAQ, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Frankfurt Stock Exchange, Euronext, London Stock 
Exchange, Korean Stock Exchange, Australian Stock Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange, 
and Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  See infra fig.1. 
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Figure 2.  Market Sector of Publicly Traded 
Companies Convicted 2001 - 2010 (n = 54) 
Manufacturing (13)
Food (8)
Pharmaceuticals (7)
Transportation (7)
Chemicals/Materials (7)
Energy (5)
Defense (4)
Services (3)
Figure 1.  Companies Listed by Stock Exchange (n = 
54) 
NYSE (27)
NASDAQ (7)
Tokyo SE (5)
Frankfurt SE (3)
Euronext (3)
London SE (3)
Korean SE (3)
Hong Kong SE (1)
Australian SE (1)
Toronto SE (1)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The predominant types of offenses were Environmental/Food Safety 
(19) and Antitrust (16).  Other common offenses were False 
Statements/Obstruction (6), Pharma/Drug (4), and FCPA (4).  Fraud (2), 
Export (2), and Terrorist Transactions (1) were also represented.  The most 
notable absences from the list were those involving fraud and financial 
crimes, as only one instance of securities fraud was found.
96
  These data are 
represented in Figure 3. 
 
 96.  See infra app. A. 
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Figure 3.  Primary Criminal Charges Pleaded to by 
Publicly Traded Corporations 2001 - 2010 (n = 54) 
Environmental/Food Safety
(19)
Antitrust (16)
False
Statements/Obstruction (6)
Pharma/Drug (4)
FCPA (4)
Fraud (2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Company Fates 
Of the fifty-four publicly traded companies convicted in the years 
2001–2010, a large majority (37) are currently active, that is, they are listed 
on the same stock exchange that they were listed on at the time of their 
conviction, and they have not undergone a merger, acquisition, or name 
change.  These data are shown in Figure 4.  A smaller but still significant 
number (17) are no longer active on their original stock exchange under 
their original name, or are currently active under that name but only after 
suffering a business failure and reorganizing.  Of those seventeen 
companies, twelve merged with or were acquired by another company 
under favorable circumstances that did not implicate a business failure.  
These were ICN Pharmaceuticals,
97
 MacDermid,
98
 OMI Corp.,
99
 Crompton 
 
 97.  As noted above, ICN was convicted twice, and for consistency is counted as two 
separate convictions.  ICN changed its name in 2003 to Valeant Pharmaceuticals.  See 
Ronald D. White, What’s in a Name Change? A New Image, ICN Hopes, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
12, 2003, at B1 (discussing how ICN changed its name to Valeant Pharmaceuticals in order 
to escape a tarnished image).  Valeant was acquired in 2010 in a transaction valued at $3.3 
billion.  Pav Jordan & Esha Dey, Drugmaker Biovail to Buy Valeant in $3.3 Billion Deal, 
REUTERS (June 21, 2010, 5:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/21/us-biovail-
valeant-idUSTRE65K1LA20100621. 
 98.  MacDermid was acquired in 2006 in a transaction valued at $1.3 billion, and 
shareholders received a premium on their shares.  MacDermid Incorporated Announces 
Signing of Merger Agreement, BUSINESS WIRE NEWS RELEASE (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www. 
wnd.com/markets/news/read/797311/macdermid_incorporated_announces_signing_of_mer
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Corp.,
100
 Titan Corp.,
101
 XTO Energy,
102
 Cephalon,
103
 Herley Industries,
104
 
Rhodia,
105
 Hynix Semiconductors,
106
 and British Airways.
107
 
 
 
ger_agreement. 
 99.  OMI Corp. was acquired in 2007 in a transaction valued at $2.2 billion.  OMI Corp 
to Be Acquired by Teekay and TRMD for $29.95 per Share, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2007, 5:03 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/17/idUSIN20070417170349OMM20070417. 
 100.  Crompton Corporation acquired and merged with Great Lake Chemical 
Corporation in 2005 (subsequently changing its name to Chemtura) in a deal that was 
apparently very favorable for investors.  Crompton and Great Lakes Merge, ICIS.COM (Mar. 
14, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.icis.com/Articles/2005/03/11/659739/crompton-and-
great-lakes-merge.html.  The new company was led by Crompton’s old board.  Crompton 
Corporation and Great Lakes Chemical Corporation Announce Merger to Create Major 
New Specialty Chemicals Company, CHEMTURA (Mar. 9, 2005, 6:20 AM), 
http://investor.chemtura.com/press-release/great-lakes-historical/crompton-corporation-and-
great-lakes-chemical-corporation-annou. 
 101.  Titan Corp. was acquired by L-3 Communications in June 2005, three months after 
being convicted of FCPA violations and paying a $28.5 million fine.  See infra app. B.  
News reports celebrated Titan’s record revenues and stated that an earlier merger deal had 
fallen through because of the then-unresolved charges.  L-3 Communications Acquires 
Titan, DEFENSE INDUSTRY DAILY (June 8, 2005, 8:21 AM), http://www.defenseindustrydai 
ly.com/l3-communications-acquires-titan-0663/.  The deal was valued at $2.65 billion.  Id. 
 102.  XTO Energy was acquired by ExxonMobil Corp. in 2010 in a deal valued at $41 
billion.  Michael J. de la Merced, Exxon Mobil to Buy XTO Energy for $31 Billion, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 14, 2009, 8:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/ 
exxonmobil-to-buy-xto-energy-for-41-billion/. 
 103.  Cephalon was acquired by Teva Pharmaceuticals in 2011 in a deal valued at $6.2 
billion.  Naomi Kresge & Robert Langreth, Teva Bets on Stem Cells, Cancer in $6.2 Billion 
Bid for Cephalon, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/n 
ews/2011-05-02/teva-to-acquire-cephalon-for-81-50-per-share-in-cash.html. 
 104.  Herley Industries was acquired in 2011 by Kratos Defense and Security Solutions 
in a deal worth $270 million.  Kratos Acquiring Herley Industries, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Feb 
8, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/ 
02/08/Kratos-acquiring-Herley-Industries/UPI-45991297164637/. 
 105.  Rhodia was acquired by the Solvay Group in 2011 in a deal valued at €6.6 billion.  
Will Beacham, Solvay Merger with Rhodia to Create Global Leader in Polymers and 
Consumer Products, ICIS: LOOK EAST FOR CHEMICALS (Apr. 4, 2011, 10:11 AM), http:// 
www.icis.com/blogs/east-european-chemicals/2011/04/solvay-merger-with-rhodia-to-
create-global-leader-in-polymers-and-consumer-products.html. 
 106.  Hynix was partially bought out and merged with the South Korean conglomerate 
SK Telecom in 2011, in a deal valued at $3.1 billion.  Jun Yang & Seonjin Cha, SK Telecom 
will Acquire 21% Stake in Hynix Semiconductor for $3.05 billion, BLOOMBERG (Nov 14, 
2011, 4:32 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-14/sk-telecom-will-acquire-21-
stake-in-hynix-semiconductor-for-3-05-billion.html. 
 107.  British Airways merged with the Spanish airline Iberia in 2011.  British Airways 
trades for Last Time Ahead of Iberia Merger, GUARDIAN (London) (Jan. 20, 2011, 3:26 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jan/20/british-airways-trades-last-time-
merger. 
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Figure 4.  Company Fate After Conviction (n = 54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, forty-nine of the fifty-four companies convicted in the years 
2001–2010 are either currently active or are no longer active under their 
original name because of favorable mergers or acquisitions.  But, in 
contrast to these ultimately successful companies, five companies suffered 
fates that could reasonably be described as business failures.  These 
companies were Utilicorp United, Winn-Dixie Stores, Elpida Memory, 
Energy Partners, Ltd., and Japan Airlines International.
108
  Of these five 
companies, three filed for bankruptcy, while two were ultimately acquired 
by another company under conditions that could arguably be said to 
represent a business failure.  However, none of the companies could 
reasonably be said to have suffered a business failure because of their 
convictions. 
First off, three of the business failures—those of Utilicorp United, 
Winn-Dixie Stores, and Elpida Memory—occurred more than three years 
after the companies were convicted.
109
  This fact alone makes it extremely 
unlikely that the failures were caused by or related to the convictions.  This 
conclusion is supported by contemporary accounts.  Utilicorp, a formerly 
high-flying utility and energy trader that had copied many of Enron’s shady 
methods, went into decline after the Enron scandal made its business highly 
suspect; its ultimate unfavorable acquisition in 2007 by another utility 
company had everything to do with the fact that investors thought the 
business shady, and nothing to do with the fact that it received a 
 
 108.  See infra app. B. 
 109.  See infra app. B. 
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$1,000,000 penalty for an environmental offense six years before.
110
  
Likewise, Winn-Dixie was already in bankruptcy when it was convicted of 
an environmental offense, and it successfully reorganized several months 
afterwards; it was eventually bought out in 2011 after struggling to avoid a 
second bankruptcy.
111
  If the conviction were to have caused the failure, 
one would have expected the company to have never emerged from its first 
bankruptcy and to have gone straight into liquidation.  Similarly, while 
Elpida Memory, a Japanese semiconductor manufacturer, received an $84 
million antitrust fine in March 2006, that conviction had little to do with its 
ultimate bankruptcy in February 2012, which occurred after a global 
downturn in the PC memory market made its core business and debt levels 
unsustainable.
112
 
Contemporary accounts also show that the same is true for the two 
companies that went out of business within three years of being convicted.  
Japan Airlines International (JAL), the flag airline of Japan, filed for 
reorganization bankruptcy in January 2010, more than a year and a half 
after it pleaded guilty to an antitrust violation and paid a $110 million 
fine.
113
  While this fine was indeed quite large, it pales in comparison to the 
 
 110.  See infra apps. A, B.  Utilicorp United changed its name to Aquila shortly after the 
Enron scandal.  Utilicorp Changes Name to Aquila, Inc. Begins Trading Under Symbol ILA, 
GREAT PLAINS ENERGY (Mar. 18, 2002), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml 
?c=96211&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1201210&highlight=.  It later was acquired by Great 
Plains Energy.  Aquila Inc. Finally Sold After 5-Year Struggle, PIPELINE & GAS J., Mar. 
2007, at 2 (“The sale culminates Aquila’s stunning downfall.  Once ranked No. 33 on the 
Fortune 500 list of the nation’s largest companies, Aquila was a victim of the energy trading 
debacle that occurred around the same [time] that Enron Corp. collapsed.  Aquila lost 
billions of dollars in trading and in other unregulated businesses.”); Lisa Lee, Great Plains 
Energy to buy Aquila for $1.7 bln, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2007, 1:58 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/07/businesspro-aquila-takeover-dc-
idUSN0737190420070207 (noting that investors were unhappy and opposed the merger 
because they were being bought out at a discount, an amount at less than what their shares 
were trading at on the open market). 
 111.  Winn-Dixie entered bankruptcy in February 2005, was convicted in April 2006, 
and successfully reorganized in November 2006.  John Dobosz, Winn-Dixie: The Beef 
People at a Bargain, FORBES: STOCK OF THE WEEK (Feb. 4, 2010, 1:50 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/04/winn-dixie-publix-personal-finance-investing-ideas-
supervalu-grocery.html; infra app. A.  It was then bought out in late 2011 after continued 
brushes with going out of business.  Winn Dixie Still Struggles, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 17, 
2011), http://www.investopedia.com/stock-analysis/2011/Winn-Dixie-Still-Struggles-
WINN-KR-SVU-WMT0217.aspx#axzz1t05NwdC5; Mihir Dalal, Winn-Dixie to go private 
in $560 mln Deal, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2 
011/12/19/winndixiestores-biloidUSL3E7NJ4BA20111219. 
 112.  Hiroko Tabuchi, Japanese Computer Chip Maker Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2012, at B4. 
 113.  Japan Airlines Files for Bankruptcy Protection, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2010, 11:57 
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$25 billion of debt it owned at the time it filed for bankruptcy.
114
  
Moreover, news articles at the time blamed JAL’s failure on market 
conditions such as rising fuel prices, declining passenger volume, and 
increased competition from rival airlines, but did not mention the 
conviction.
115
  JAL was the victim of the global economy and its own 
financial problems.  It was not driven out of business by its conviction. 
The only domestic company to suffer a business failure within three 
years of conviction was Energy Partners, Ltd. (EPL), a New Orleans-based 
energy company traded on the NYSE.  EPL was convicted of a minor 
environmental offense in February 2008 and sentenced to pay a $75,000 
fine along with an additional $25,000 community service penalty.
116
  A 
year later, after suffering financial troubles, it was delisted from the NYSE, 
and in May 2009, with its business “struggl[ing] with deteriorating 
commodity prices and lengthy hurricane shutdowns,” it filed for chapter 11 
reorganization bankruptcy.
117
  The company, which suffered losses of 
between $40 and $50 million in 2008, blamed its financial troubles on “a 
combination of lower oil and natural gas prices and anticipated reduced 
capital spending based on the lower commodity price environment.”
118
  As 
reported at the time, the President of the Louisiana Oil and Gas Association 
supported this assessment by stating that EPL’s “predicament is an extreme 
version of a situation many energy companies are facing in Louisiana and 
across the nation.”
119
  Like Elpida and JAL, EPL was driven to failure by 
its own debt load and the global economic collapse.  There is no plausible 
reason to suspect that a minor environmental conviction was the straw that 
broke the company’s back. 
 
 
 
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8466997.stm; infra app. B. 
 114.  Mayumi Negishi & Mariko Katsumura, Japan Airlines Files for $25 Billion 
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2010, 12:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19 
/us-jal-idUSTRE60H4NA20100119. 
 115.  Id.; Japan Airlines Files for Bankruptcy Protection, supra note 113. 
 116.  See infra app. B (showing a total of $100,000 in penalties for EPL). 
 117.  Kimberly Quillen, Energy Partners Files Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans) (May 1, 2009, 10:56 AM), http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/200 
9/05/energy_partners_files_chapter.html; Jen DeGregorio, Energy Partners to Be Delisted 
from New York Stock Exchange, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Mar. 25, 2009, 5:23 PM), 
http://blog.nola.com/tpmoney/2009/03/energy_partners_to_be_delisted.html. 
 118.  DeGregorio, supra note 117. 
 119.  Id. 
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Figure 5.  Plea Agreement Characteristics (n = 54) 
C. Plea Characteristics 
The fifty-four convictions in this sample reveal a wealth of data on 
corporation plea agreements, the most important of which are presented in 
Figure 5.  The total monetary penalties attached to a conviction ranged 
from a diminutive $20,000 environmental fine on XTO Energy to an 
enormous $1.615 billion total penalty on Eli Lilly for distributing and 
advertising misbranded pharmaceuticals.
120
  Of the fifty-four convictions in 
this study, forty-three involved a monetary penalty greater than $1 million, 
twenty-eight involved a penalty greater than $10 million, and thirteen 
involved a penalty greater than $100 million. 
More importantly, many of the convictions in this study contained 
agreements to implement the kinds of structural reforms that are usually 
thought of as only being obtainable through the use of DPAs.  While plea 
agreements were only available for thirty-four of the fifty-four convictions, 
the agreements that were available, when combined with the courts’ docket 
sheets, allow for a partial picture of what may be achieved with plea 
agreements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120.  See infra app. B (detailing the range of plea penalties for public companies 
convicted in the years 2001–2010). 
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One-third (18) of the guilty pleas contained agreements that the 
defendant corporation would fully and completely cooperate with the 
government’s investigation into other aspects of the defendant’s business, 
with parallel civil litigation, or in prosecutions of individual corporate 
officers.  Nearly one-quarter (13) also contained compliance programs, 
most of which were extremely detailed in the same fashion as are 
compliance plans put in place through DPAs.  Additionally, several (4) 
guilty pleas required the defendant corporations to hire corporate monitors 
to conduct independent oversight of their  businesses.  Finally, one plea 
agreement required a defendant to make a partial waiver of its attorney–
client privilege
121
 and one plea agreement required the defendant to 
perform community service. 
 
D. Implications: No Evidence of an Andersen Effect 
No public company convicted in the years 2001–2010 went out of 
business because of a federal criminal conviction.  This result calls the 
conventional wisdom about the Andersen Effect into serious doubt.  If it 
were true that “prosecution alone [can] destroy even the most established of 
companies,” then at least some of the public companies convicted in the 
years 2001–2010 should have gone out of business following their 
convictions.
122
  Yet none of them did. 
What explains this result?  Several possible explanations come to 
mind.  First and most obviously, the destruction of a company by a 
conviction could be the exception rather than the rule.  Second, it could be 
possible that it is the uncertainty of indictment and possible conviction at 
trial, rather than the mere fact of a conviction negotiated by plea 
agreement, that destroys companies.  It is logical to assume that, because 
cooperation can allow defendants to negotiate for lower penalties, 
companies convicted by plea agreement would have a better chance of 
survival than companies convicted at trial.  Third, it could simply be that 
the DOJ is only prosecuting companies that are “healthy” enough to 
survive a conviction.  All of these explanations are at least plausible, 
though none are completely satisfactory. 
The first explanation, which I believe is the most likely to be true, is 
that the Andersen Effect, that is, the possibility of driving a company out of 
 
 121.  The privilege waiver was required in the case of Chiquita Brands International, 
which, in March 2007, was convicted of transacting with terrorist groups.  Infra apps. A, B. 
 122.  Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1436. 
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business through the collateral consequences of prosecution, is generally 
not a threat to most large public companies.  Only five of the companies in 
this study went out of business, and none of them did so under 
circumstances that could plausibly be connected to their convictions.
123
  
This is not to say, of course, that convictions can never cause established 
companies to fail.  Arthur Andersen itself would appear to be proof of that 
possibility, though it should be remembered that Andersen was a 
professional services partnership and thus subject to different stresses than 
are most public companies.  And it is certainly possible—or even certain—
that there are many small, private companies that suffered business failures 
but fell outside this study’s criteria.  Even if most companies would not be 
threatened by most convictions, the mere fact that the companies in this 
study survived does not foreclose the possibility that some companies 
could be placed at risk of going out of business because of a conviction.  
Those caveats aside, the fact remains that the complete absence of 
conviction-related failures strongly supports the conclusion that the 
Andersen Effect does not exist. 
The second possible explanation is that it is indictment and conviction 
by jury verdict that is deadly to the corporate defendant, rather than mere 
conviction by guilty plea.  As noted, more than ninety percent of 
convictions of organizations in the federal system happen through guilty 
plea,
124
 but Andersen was convicted at trial.  It is not implausible that the 
Andersen Effect might be limited to convictions obtained by indictment 
and guilty verdict.  My data are inconclusive on this point.  As discussed, 
all fifty-four convictions in this study occurred by plea agreement, while 
only two of the companies were initially charged by indictment.  
Interestingly, neither of those two companies (Overseas Shipholding Group 
and Herley Industries) was among the five companies that suffered 
business failures.
125
  But even if it is the rare indictment and conviction by 
guilty verdict that is the true corporation-killer, the sheer rarity of 
indictment and trial still leaves the Andersen Effect as the exception and 
not the rule.  Most convictions will still occur by plea agreement and will 
not give prosecutors or policymakers cause for concern. 
The third possible explanation could be that prosecutions are 
occurring selectively for fear of the Andersen Effect or for some other 
reason.  As already noted, the original Holder Memo stated that prosecutors 
 
 123.  See supra section III.B. 
 124.  Supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 125.  See infra app. B (reporting that Overseas Shipholding Group is still active and 
Herley Industries has merged with another corporation). 
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should consider potential collateral consequences in making charging 
decisions.
126
  Moreover, in his recent remarks, former Assistant Attorney 
General Breuer went to great lengths to explain how the DOJ takes 
potential collateral consequences into account when it makes charging 
decisions.
127
  Furthermore, the current literature suggests that prosecutors 
target certain market sectors for prosecution and others for DPAs, and my 
data add some additional support to that conclusion.
128
  Of the companies in 
my dataset, nearly all were firms like chemical companies, manufacturing 
companies, and shipping companies—all companies that make or utilize 
tangible products and materials.  By contrast, firms that provided intangible 
services such as investment banking were entirely absent from the list of 
convicted companies.
129
  In fact, no public companies involved in the 
financial sector were convicted in the years 2001–2010, a result that is 
particularly provocative in light of the current controversy over the 
government’s failure to aggressively prosecute firms and individuals 
involved in the recent financial crisis.
130
  Likewise, thirty-five of the fifty-
four convictions in my dataset were for environmental and antitrust 
offenses, respectively, but only two convictions were for offenses involving 
fraud. 
 
 126.  Holder Memo, supra note 25. 
 127.  See Breuer, supra note 46 (explaining how the DOJ considers the effects of a 
charge on innocent employees, shareholders, the health of a particular industry, and the 
market as a whole). 
 128.  Notably, Professor Garrett found that foreign companies, which were mainly large 
firms, were primarily being convicted of antitrust and environmental violations, while firms 
being targeted for fraud violations received a disproportionate number of DPAs.  Garrett, 
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 11, at 1874–76 figs.4–6. 
 129.  See infra app. A (showing that the list of convicted companies does not include any 
that provide such services). 
 130.  See infra apps. A, B (reporting that companies in the financial sector are not on the 
list of convicted companies).  Many commentators, particularly those in the popular press, 
have castigated the government’s failure to prosecute “Wall Street.”  See, e.g., William 
Greider, How Wall Street Crooks Get out of Jail Free, THE NATION, Apr. 11, 2011, at 11–14 
(describing the government’s unwillingness to prosecute Wall Street following the financial 
crisis as a conflict of values where corporate capitalism has defeated society’s sense of right 
and wrong); Morgenson & Story, supra note 45 (noting that prosecutors have largely ceased 
prosecuting financial firms in favor of using DPAs); Alex Pareene, No One Went to Jail, so 
Why is Wall Street So Mad?, SALON (May 7, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/ 
05/07/no_one_went_to_jail_so_why_is_wall_street_so_mad/ (arguing that President 
Obama’s inaction has only emboldened those individuals involved in the financial crisis 
because they have faced no legal repercussions); Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, 
ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-
isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216 (providing details about a variety of cases against Wall 
Street firms that did not result in any convictions and characterizing the SEC as ineffective 
and corrupt). 
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Thus, it is possible that prosecutors may be selectively prosecuting 
companies that they believe can stand the shock of conviction while they 
are entering into DPAs with companies that they fear would fail if 
convicted.  Unfortunately, the evidence neither supports nor casts doubt on 
this explanation.  While the data show that prosecutors disproportionately 
pursue convictions for some offenses while they instead pursue DPAs for 
others, the data alone cannot tell us why prosecutors are taking these 
actions.  And even if the DOJ is declining to prosecute companies for fear 
of the Andersen Effect, there is no evidence that its fear is justified or that 
the companies ultimately convicted are any healthier than those that receive 
DPAs.  While a future article could further explore this possibility, perhaps 
by comparing the market fundamentals of convicted companies to the 
fundamentals of companies that receive DPAs, the current evidence is 
inconclusive on this point. 
Though the possibility that the DOJ is preempting the Andersen Effect 
by pursuing DPAs when companies are at risk cannot be entirely 
discounted, there is no data to support it either.  One clear result remains:  
No company publicly traded on a major stock exchange failed because of a 
conviction that occurred in the years 2001-2010.  There is no empirical 
evidence to support the existence of the Andersen Effect. 
 
E. Implications: Structural Reforms May Be Obtained Through 
Convictions 
Additionally, as part of their plea bargains, many convicted companies 
in this study agreed to the exact types of detailed compliance programs and 
structural reforms that DPAs often implement.  Of the fifty-four 
convictions, thirteen involved the implementation of a compliance program 
while four involved the implementation of a corporate monitor.
131
  Of these, 
all of the convictions that implemented corporate monitors and ten of the 
thirteen convictions implementing compliance programs came after the 
year 2006, likely indicating that the DOJ only recently began to regularly 
use plea agreements to obtain such reforms.
132
 
These results call into question the necessity of using DPAs as a 
means to impose compliance programs and corporate monitors on law-
breaking companies.  Guilty pleas can and increasingly are being used to 
obtain the implementation of the types of structural reforms often thought 
 
 131.  See infra app. B. 
 132.  See infra apps. A, B. 
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of as being exclusive to DPAs. 
 
IV. OUTLINING A “CORE BUSINESS MODEL” OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS 
The data presented above do not prove that companies never go out of 
business because of convictions, but they indisputably show that the 
conventional wisdom is more than misguided:  It is simply wrong.  
Prosecution may drive large companies out of business in some rare 
situations, but it is not the “corporate death penalty” that ideological 
hyperbole has made it out to be.  In fact, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, prosecutors, defense counsel, and policymakers should assume 
that convictions will only cause large companies to suffer business failures 
in extraordinary situations. 
Of course, even though it is the rare situation where a prosecution 
dooms a company, the consequences of such a failure, if it occurs, may 
very well be disastrous.  Like the doctor who needs to know when a 
particular patient is predisposed towards heart disease, prosecutors and 
policymakers need to know when a particular corporation is at risk of 
failing if prosecuted.  The remainder of this Article briefly describes a new 
model for predicting when convictions are likely to destroy corporations, 
and it explains what new steps should be taken in light of this model. 
I hypothesize that, in the overwhelming majority of situations, a 
conviction will only cause a corporation to go out of business when it 
threatens the corporation’s ability to conduct its core business.  As a 
starting point for this model, I draw on one of the tenets of rational choice 
theory.  Namely, I assume that the markets and most of the major players in 
those markets are, on the whole, economically rational actors that act in 
their own financial self-interest.  This assumption is critical because it 
provides a basis for determining, in any given situation, how and why a 
company might go out of business.  While many commentators point 
towards reputational damage, disbarment, and other collateral 
consequences of conviction, there is little broader effort to understand the 
causal chain of events that leads from conviction to business failure. 
With that assumption in mind, I next divide the possible consequences 
of conviction into two broad categories:  acute harms and structural harms.  
Acute harms are those that will have short-term consequences but are one-
off events that, if survived, do not implicate the corporation’s long-term 
chance of survival.  Typical examples of such harms would be most 
monetary penalties, damaged credit ratings, and general reputational 
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damage.  These harms can be very damaging, for sure, and can cause 
decreased revenues or conceivably even trigger liquidity crises in certain 
circumstances.  Yet, in most situations, they do not cast doubt upon a large 
corporation’s chance of survival.  Structural harms, by contrast, are those 
which are both long-lasting and which make the corporation unable or less 
able to produce or market its core products and services.  These harms 
could appear in a variety of forms, but all follow a pattern: Where the 
conviction would eliminate the demand for the corporation’s products or 
services in a marketplace of economically rational actors or eliminate the 
corporation’s ability to provide those products or services, a structural harm 
will occur and the corporation’s viability will be threatened. 
Consider two hypothetical examples:  Greedy Corporation and Evil 
Corporation.
133
  Greedy Corporation, a large manufacturer of components 
used in widget production, pleads guilty to antitrust violations for fixing the 
prices of its widget components, is fined $1 billion, and is forced to appoint 
a corporate monitor and begin an expensive, intrusive compliance program.  
Greedy has to revise its future earnings expectations downwards, and its 
credit rating is cut to near-junk status.  Greedy has suffered only acute 
harms; while its profitability and ability to obtain credit has decreased, its 
core business has not been impacted.  Greedy can still make its widget 
components, and the widget-makers will still buy them in order to build 
their widgets.  Any reputational harm to Greedy will be largely irrelevant; 
the companies that purchase its products may be displeased upon learning 
that they had been swindled in the past, but they still need to make widgets, 
and Greedy’s crime does not call into question its ability to make desirable 
widget components.  In the absence of some other problem, Greedy will 
survive. 
Evil Corporation, by contrast, is a large defense contractor that is 
convicted of committing arms export violations.  While it is a multibillion-
dollar business, nearly half of its revenue comes from its main customer, 
the federal government.  Upon its conviction, the government excludes Evil 
from all government contracts for the indefinite future.  The conviction has 
thus caused a lasting decrease in the demand for Evil’s products in the 
marketplace, and Evil has thus suffered a severe structural harm.  Investors 
will likely desert it, and its business may be likely to fail. 
The existing evidence supports the Core Business Model that I 
propose.  Most of the companies in the dataset suffered severe acute harms 
as a result of their convictions, but did not suffer structural harms.  Eli 
Lilly, the pharmaceuticals giant, pleaded guilty in 2009 to selling 
 
 133.  With apologies to Professor Jens Dammann. 
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misbranded drugs, agreed to pay $1.65 billion in criminal fines and civil 
settlements, and agreed to a compliance plan.
134
  These harms were all 
acute harms, however, and because Eli Lilly was not excluded from 
participation in government health programs, it continued to produce and 
sell pharmaceutical products.  Eli Lilly is still in business today.  This 
makes perfect sense.  Few economically rational actors would stop 
prescribing or purchasing drugs for legitimate, necessary uses simply 
because the drugs had previously been misbranded.  Doctors and customers 
might trust Eli Lilly less or potentially treat the company with moral 
opprobrium, but that would not stop more than an insignificant number of 
them from prescribing and consuming its drugs. 
Likewise, Chiquita Brands International, the large produce company, 
pleaded guilty in 2007 to transacting with designated Colombian terrorist 
groups.
135
  One might assume that “palling around with terrorists” in such a 
manner would be an unforgiveable sin these days, but that assumption 
would be mistaken.  Chiquita’s conviction caused it no structural harms, as 
it did not affect Chiquita’s ability to make and deliver produce to its 
customers, and any reputational damage it may have suffered did not cause 
it structural harm.  In the absence of a widespread boycott based on moral 
outrage, no economically rational retailer would stop buying Chiquita’s 
bananas regardless of what atrocities the corporation contributed to in 
South America. 
An even more potent example of this principle can be found in the 
recent conviction of the multinational energy giant, BP.  In November 
2012, BP pleaded guilty for its conduct in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
to eleven counts of felony manslaughter, one count of felony obstruction of 
Congress, and violations of the Clean Water Act and Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act.
136
  As part of its plea, BP—a company that had previously been 
convicted several times, including for an explosion at its Texas City 
refinery in 2005 that killed fifteen workers—was sentenced to pay a record 
$4 billion in criminal penalties.
137
  Yet, BP was not banned from drilling on 
public lands and only received a temporary suspension from receiving 
 
 134.  See infra apps. A, B. 
 135.  See infra apps. A, B. 
 136.  Press Release, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead Guilty to 
Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding 
Deepwater Horizon Incident, U.S. DEP’T OF Justice (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-ag-1369.html. 
 137.  Abrahm Lustgarten, A Stain That Won’t Wash Away, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, at 
A23.  
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government contracts, and thus it suffered no structural harms.
138
  As the 
Core Business Model would predict, its stock price barely moved, and the 
company remains hugely profitable, much to the distress of the many who 
advocated that the company receive a far more severe sanction for the 
criminal negligence that caused the largest environmental catastrophe in 
U.S. history.
139
 
By contrast, Utilicorp United was forced into an unfavorable merger 
because of weakness in its core energy trading business, a weakness that 
arose from its investors’ fundamental distrust of the energy trading model 
that Utilicorp used.
140
  This weakness (though unrelated to its conviction) 
caused Utilicorp structural harm by preventing it from being able to 
successfully monetize that sector of its business, and it ultimately drove the 
company to seek an unfavorable merger. 
The fate of Arthur Andersen itself fits well in the Core Business 
Model.  The fall of Enron and Andersen’s subsequent indictment and 
conviction caused an enormous structural harm to Andersen by destroying 
the value of its product.  Andersen, one of the “big five” accounting firms, 
was a hugely prestigious organization.  Its core product was not simply 
accounting services; rather, it was the trustworthiness of its name.  
Andersen’s clients utilized its services as a way to tell the government and 
their own creditors and investors that their books were overseen by a 
trustworthy, highly reputable accountant.  That trustworthiness was exactly 
what was destroyed by the Enron scandal and Andersen’s conviction.  With 
its reputation shattered, Andersen had no product to offer. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Using the Core Business Model as a starting point, both the DOJ and 
corporate defense counsel should change their respective strategies.  The 
DOJ in particular should radically revamp its much criticized program of 
using DPAs by increasing its willingness to demand guilty pleas of 
corporate defendants, and, if necessary, issuing indictments and taking 
 
   138.   Roberta Rampton & Timothy Gardner, U.S. Bans BP From New Government 
Contracts After Oil Spill Deal, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/11/28/us-bp-contracts-idUSBRE8AR0M120121128. 
 139.  See, e.g., Tyson Slocum, Public Citizen’s Take on BP Settlement, CITIZENVOX 
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.citizenvox.org/2012/11/15/public-citizen-bp-settlement/ 
(attacking the criminal plea as “pathetic” and “inadequate to address BP’s repeated criminal 
conduct”). 
 140.  See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
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defendants to trial.  By basing its actions on the knowledge that most 
corporations will not go out of business if convicted and by using the core 
business model to predict which corporations might be at risk, the DOJ can 
confidently prosecute more companies without fear of creating another 
Andersen-style collapse.  The DOJ should continue to use DPAs only in 
those instances where the Core Business Model predicts that a prosecution 
might actually threaten a company’s survival. 
Such a shift towards increased prosecutions and away from DPAs 
would both increase deterrence of corporate wrongdoing and further the 
interests of justice.  The data show that the two main reasons for using 
DPAs—the Andersen Effect and the supposed inability to gain compliance 
programs and structural reforms through guilty pleas—are largely invalid.  
The Core Business Model can be used to help predict those rare situations 
where business failures may occur, and the data show that plea agreements 
can be used to obtain structural reforms just as successfully as DPAs can.  
With this new information, there is little justification for using DPAs in 
most cases.  Prosecutors should seek convictions when they can, use DPAs 
only when they absolutely must, and decline to prosecute when they have a 
weak case that can only be successfully prosecuted by improperly 
pressuring a defendant.  By adopting these methods, the DOJ can both 
increase deterrence of corporate crime and operate in a manner that is more 
transparent and more respectful of defendants’ rights.
141
 
Likewise, defense counsel should recognize that the effects of 
corporate convictions are widely overstated—particularly given the 
government’s apparent reluctance to bar convicted companies from 
government contracts—and that the Core Business Model can be used to 
help predict which offenses a defendant can safely plead to.  Though a 
 
 141.  In the time since this Article was submitted for editing, there has been some 
indication that a shift in the direction I recommend may, in fact, be beginning.  In the weeks 
after the DOJ announced the now-infamous HSBC DPA, it finalized guilty plea agreements 
with the Japanese subsidiaries of two banks, UBS and the Royal Bank of Scotland, as part of 
larger settlements (complete with DPAs for the parent companies) of those companies’ 
involvement in the LIBOR interest-rate rigging scandal.  Ben Protess, Prosecutors, Shifting 
Strategy, Build New Wall Street Cases, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 18, 2013, 10:00 PM) 
[hereinafter Prostess, New Wall Street Cases], 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/prosecutors-build-a-better-strategy-to-go-after-
wall-street/?hp.  These prosecutions were the first to target global banking companies in two 
decades.  Ben Protess, Leniency Denied, UBS Unit Admits Guilt in Rate Case, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/leniency-
denied-ubs-unit-admits-guilt-in-rate-case/?hp.  Though these cases only involved foreign 
subsidiaries, there is some speculation that the DOJ is laying the groundwork for 
prosecutions of parent financial companies.  Protess, New Wall Street Cases, supra.  Only 
time will tell. 
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guilty plea will necessarily involve admitting to a crime and accepting the 
resulting stigma, pleading guilty may be the preferable option in some 
cases, particularly if doing so would allow the defendant to avoid agreeing 
to certain onerous structural reforms that might be attached to a DPA.  And 
in some extreme cases, if the prosecution has a particularly weak case but 
still demands a harsh DPA, it may even be preferable to roll the dice and go 
to trial. 
Corporate prosecutions are a necessary part of the modern American 
legal system.  This Article has attempted to answer one of the most 
pressing issues in this area of the law:  whether and when corporations may 
be prosecuted without driving them out of business and causing terrible 
consequences to society and the economy.  The important, often emotional, 
and highly political topic of corporate criminal prosecutions has escaped 
empirical scrutiny for too long.  It is time to cast aside the gut feelings and 
ideological truisms that have thus far dominated the debate and begin 
basing our policies on cold data.  By showing that there is no evidence that 
the “Andersen Effect” exists and thus that the “corporate death penalty” is 
no more than a bogeyman, by showing that plea agreements can be used to 
obtain structural reforms, and by formulating the basis for a new Core 
Business Model of corporate prosecutions, this Article provides a starting 
point for an informed, data-driven debate on when and how corporate 
criminal prosecutions should occur. 
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Appendix A.  Companies Convicted 2001 – 2010, With Market Sector and Offense 
Company 
Conviction 
Date 
Exchange – 
Ticker Sector Offense 
Utilicorp United Mar. 2001 NYSE – UCU Energy Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Kaydon Corp. Apr. 2001 NYSE – KDN Manufacturing False Statements/ 
Obstruction 
 
Sara Lee Corp. June 2001 NYSE – SLE Food Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
MacDermid, Inc. Nov. 2001 NYSE – MRD Chemicals/ 
Materials 
Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
ICN 
Pharmaceuticals 
Dec. 2001 NYSE – ICN Pharmaceuticals Fraud 
 
 
Carnival Corp. Apr. 2002 NYSE – CCL Services False Statements/ 
Obstruction 
 
Ashland Inc. May 2002 NYSE – ASH Energy Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
ICN 
Pharmaceuticals 
June 2002 NYSE – ICN Pharmaceuticals Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Koppers 
Industries 
Aug. 2002 NYSE– KOP Chemicals/ 
Materials 
Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
OMI Corp. Jan. 2004 NYSE – OMM Transportation Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Crompton Corp. Mar. 2004 NYSE – CK Chemicals/ 
Materials 
Antitrust 
 
 
Nash-Finch Co. Aug. 2004 NASDAQ – 
NAFC 
Food Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Titan Corp. Mar. 2005 NYSE – TTN Defense FCPA 
 
ConAgra Foods Sep. 2005 NYSE – CAG Food Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Eli Lilly Dec. 2005 NYSE – LLY Pharmaceuticals Pharma/Drug 
 
Winn-Dixie 
Stores 
Apr. 2006 NASDAQ – 
WINN 
Food Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Chiquita Brands 
Int'l 
Mar. 2007 NYSE – CQB Food Terrorist Transactions 
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Overseas 
Shipholding 
Group 
Mar. 2007 NYSE – OSB Transportation False Statements/ 
Obstruction 
 
 
ITT Corp. Mar. 2007 NYSE – ITT Defense Export Violations 
 
Bristol Myers 
Squibb 
June 2007 NYSE – BMY Pharmaceuticals False Statements/ 
Obstruction 
 
Honeywell 
International 
Sep. 2007 NYSE – HON Manufacturing Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Rowan 
Companies 
Oct. 2007 NYSE – RDC Energy Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Energy Partners, 
Ltd. 
Feb. 2008 NYSE – EPL Energy Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Archer Daniels 
Midland Co. 
Mar. 2008 NYSE – ADM Food Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
MTS Systems 
Corp. 
Mar. 2008 NASDAQ – 
MTSC 
Manufacturing Export Violations 
 
 
XTO Energy Apr. 2008 NYSE – XTO Energy Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Cephalon Sep. 2008 NASDAQ – 
CHR 
Pharmaceuticals Pharma/Drug 
 
 
Herley Industries May 2008 NASDAQ – 
HRLY 
Defense False 
Statements/Obstruction 
 
Exxon Mobil 
Corp. 
Sep. 2008 NYSE – XOM Energy Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Eli Lilly Jan. 2009 NYSE – LLY Pharmaceuticals Pharma/Drug 
 
Tyson Foods, 
Inc. 
June 2009 NYSE – TSN Food Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Innospec, Inc. 
 
Mar. 2010 NASDAQ – 
IOSP 
Chemicals/ 
Materials 
FCPA 
 
 
Allergan Sep. 2010 NYSE – AGN Pharmaceuticals Pharma/Drug 
 
G&K Services Sep. 2010 NASDAQ – 
GKSR 
Services Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Ibiden Co., Ltd Oct. 2001 TYO – 4062 Manufacturing Antitrust 
 
Morgan Crucible 
Co. 
Nov. 2002 LSE – MGCR Manufacturing False 
Statements/Obstruction 
 
Rhodia Inc. June 2004 Euronext – 
RHA 
Chemicals/ 
Materials 
Environmental/Food 
Safety 
 
Infineon 
Technologies AG 
Oct. 2004 FWB – IFX Manufacturing Antitrust 
MARKOFF - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2013  12:41 PM 
2013] MYTH OF THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY 839 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bayer AG Dec. 2004 FWB – BAYN Chemicals/ 
Materials 
 
Antitrust 
Hynix 
Semiconductor 
 
May 2005 KRX – 000660 Manufacturing Antitrust 
Samsung 
Electronics Corp. 
 
Oct. 2005 KRX – 005930 Manufacturing Antitrust 
Elpida Memory Mar. 2006 TYO – 6665 Manufacturing Antitrust 
 
Solvay S.A. Mar. 2006 Euronext – 
SOLB 
Chemicals/ 
Materials 
 
Antitrust 
Bennett 
Environmental 
Inc. 
 
Jul. 2007 TSE – BEI Services Fraud 
Air France/KLM Jul. 2007 Euronext – AF Transportation Antitrust 
 
British Airways Aug. 2007 LSE – BAY Transportation Antitrust 
 
Qantas Airways Nov. 2007 ASX – QAN Transportation Antitrust 
 
Japan Airlines 
International 
 
May 2008 TYO – 9205 Transportation Antitrust 
Cathay Pacific 
Airways Ltd. 
 
Aug. 2008 SEHK – 0293 Transportation Antitrust 
Siemens AG Dec. 2008 FWB – SIE Manufacturing FCPA 
 
Sharp Corp. Dec. 2008 TYO – 6753 Manufacturing Antitrust 
 
LG Display Co., 
Ltd. 
 
Dec. 2008 KRX – 034220 Manufacturing Antitrust 
BAE Systems 
PLC 
 
Mar. 2010 LSE – BA Defense FCPA 
Panasonic Corp. Nov. 2010 TYO – 6752 Manufacturing Antitrust 
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Appendix B.  Companies Convicted 2001 – 2010, Plea Details and Company Fate 
Company 
Compliance 
Plan Monitor 
Total 
Penalty Other Fate Time 
Utilicorp United UNK UNK 1,000,000  Failed > 3 years 
Kaydon Corp. UNK UNK 1,000,000  Active N/A 
 
Sara Lee Corp. UNK UNK 3,200,000  Active N/A 
 
MacDermid, 
Inc. 
UNK UNK 2,003,000  Merged > 3 years 
 
 
ICN 
Pharmaceuticals 
UNK UNK 5,600,000  Merged > 3 years 
 
 
Carnival Corp. Y N 18,000,000  Active N/A 
 
Ashland Inc. UNK UNK 9,150,000  Active N/A 
 
ICN 
Pharmaceuticals 
UNK UNK 40,000  Merged > 3 years 
 
 
Koppers 
Industries 
Y UNK 3,000,000  Active N/A 
 
 
OMI Corp. UNK UNK 4,200,000  Merged > 3 years 
 
Crompton Corp. N N 50,000,000  Merged > 1 year 
 
Nash-Finch Co. UNK UNK 400,000  Active N/A 
 
Titan Corp. UNK UNK 28,500,000  Merged < 1 year 
 
ConAgra Foods UNK UNK 250,000  Active N/A 
 
Eli Lilly Y N 30,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
Winn-Dixie 
Stores 
UNK UNK 200,000  Failed > 3 years 
 
 
Chiquita Brands 
Int’l 
Y N 25,000,000 PW, 
Coop. 
Active N/A 
 
 
Overseas 
Shipholding 
Group 
Y Y 37,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
 
 
ITT Corp. N N 30,000,000  Active N/A 
 
Bristol Myers 
Squibb 
N N 1,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
 
Honeywell 
International 
Y N 10,000,000  Active N/A 
 
 
Rowan 
Companies 
UNK UNK 8,000,000  Active N/A 
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Energy 
Partners, Ltd. 
N N 100,000 Coop. Failed > 1 year 
 
 
Archer Daniels 
Midland Co. 
N N 100,000  Active N/A 
 
 
MTS Systems 
Corp. 
N N 400,000  Active N/A 
 
 
XTO Energy Y N 20,000  Merged > 1 year 
 
Cephalon N N 425,000,000  Merged > 1 year 
 
Herley 
Industries 
N N 6,000,000  Merged > 1 year 
 
 
Exxon Mobil 
Corp. 
Y N 600,000  Active N/A 
 
 
Eli Lilly Y UNK 1,615,000,000  Active N/A 
 
Tyson Foods, 
Inc. 
N N 500,000  Active N/A 
 
 
Innospec, Inc. Y Y 14,100,000  Active N/A 
 
Allergan Y N 650,000,000  Active N/A 
 
G&K Services N N 450,000  Active N/A 
 
Ibiden Co., Ltd UNK UNK 3,600,000  Active N/A 
 
Morgan 
Crucible Co. 
N N 1,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
 
Rhodia Inc. N N 18,000,000 Comm. 
Service 
Merged > 3 years 
 
 
Infineon 
Technologies 
AG 
N N 160,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
 
 
Bayer AG N N 66,000,000  Active N/A 
 
Hynix 
Semiconductor 
N N 185,000,000 Coop. Merged > 3 years 
 
 
Samsung 
Electronics 
Corp. 
N N 300,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
 
 
Elpida Memory N N 84,000,000 Coop. Failed > 3 years 
 
Solvay S.A. N N 40,870,000  Active N/A 
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Bennett 
Environmental 
Inc. 
UNK UNK 2,662,000  Active N/A 
 
 
 
Air 
France/KLM 
N N 350,000,000  Active N/A 
 
 
British Airways N N 300,000,000 Coop. Merged > 3 years 
 
Qantas Airways N N 61,000,000  Active N/A 
 
Japan Airlines 
International 
N N 110,000,000 Coop. Failed > 1 year 
 
 
Cathay Pacific 
Airways Ltd. 
N N 60,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
 
Siemens AG Y Y 448,500,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
Sharp Corp. N N 120,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
LG Display Co., 
Ltd. 
N N 400,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
 
BAE Systems 
PLC 
Y Y 400,000,000 Coop. Active N/A 
 
 
Panasonic Corp. N N 49,100,000 Coop. Active N/A 
